TransparentMammoth

Public records brief · October 2026 · Updated Oct. 8, 2026 · Findings 40–67 added Nov. 6, 2026

Mammoth Lakes Flock Cameras: What the Public Records Show

Sixty-seven findings from records released by the Town and Police Department, the school district, Mammoth Hospital, and neighboring agencies, plus documented Flock successes, each linked to the original documents and Council meeting recordings.

15
license-plate cameras on the Town's account (8 approved)
25
gunshot sensors on the school district's account
~835,000
outside-agency searches that included Town cameras
$53,000+
known public cost per year

About this brief

During 2026, local residents filed California Public Records Act requests with every agency connected to the Flock Safety cameras and gunshot sensors in Mammoth Lakes. This brief summarizes what the returned records show, so readers who haven't seen them can follow each finding, where it came from, and why it matters.

Each item covers one finding: the facts, the context, a short note on why it matters, and the specific records behind it. Statements come directly from the records unless worded as an inference (“suggests,” “consistent with,” “points to”). Search counts are our own tallies of the exported logs. Quotes from Council meetings come from the official recordings, with times given as positions in each recording.

Records referenced: Town of Mammoth Lakes / Mammoth Lakes Police Department (staff reports, contracts, invoices, billing portal, device and user lists, sharing settings, policy, network and department search logs, case reports, newsletter); Mammoth Unified School District (emails with Flock, police, and partners; renewal notice; Flock notices); Mammoth Hospital (2024–2026 emails, security committee notes, MOU drafts, signed MOU, invoice); Bishop Police Department; Kern Community College District; Mono County Sheriff. Also cited: official Town Council meeting recordings (2024–2026), an MLPD public post, and local news coverage.

Findings

  1. 1The Town Council approved a one-year, $25,000, eight-camera police program in July 2024
  2. 2The signed contract opted out of wide sharing but renewed automatically for two years
  3. 3Less than four weeks after the vote, the Police Chief asked Flock to pitch a school and hospital system
  4. 4Flock told the partners they could run their own alerts and plate searches
  5. 5The Chief organized the partners, but police stayed off the bill
  6. 6The Town's own account grew from 8 to 15 cameras without a Council vote in the returned records
  7. 7Renewals are billed as two-year terms, and the Town said the Council approved “another year”
  8. 8The first-year report to the Council covered MLPD's own searches only
  9. 9The public announcement was drafted with a contractor and overstated early camera numbers
  10. 10There are two separate Flock accounts: the Town's and the School District's
  11. 11The district's network is 25 gunshot sensors, 3 cameras, and 3 processing units
  12. 12Flock owns the hardware; each account holder controls its own data
  13. 13The partners agreed to a $21,950 first-year cost split in early 2025
  14. 14The cost-sharing agreement was signed ten months after installation
  15. 15MUSD paid the full first year, then billed partners over three years
  16. 16Police access to the district network came first, under its own short agreement
  17. 17Police use the district's networks; the paying partners do not
  18. 18Cerro Coso agreed to join, then withdrew; its replacement coverage went to the Town's Parcel
  19. 19Records identify 18 license-plate cameras and 25 gunshot sensors
  20. 20Known public costs exceed $53,000 a year
  21. 21Outside agencies ran about 835,000 searches that included the Town's cameras
  22. 22On its first day, the network was searched nationwide, including by federal agents
  23. 23MLPD's own officers searched statewide from the start
  24. 24Outside access stopped at the end of August 2025
  25. 25Since then, police routinely search three networks
  26. 26Police logged 2,332 named searches; about a third listed a case number
  27. 27Twenty-four people have held logins on the Town's account, including two Sheriff's employees
  28. 28Current settings: the main network is closed, but the new Flex network is discoverable
  29. 29MLPD's written policy describes request-by-request sharing that the logs don't reflect
  30. 30Data leaves the live system after 30 days, but not every copy is deleted
  31. 31The gunshot sensors keep audio clips of ordinary sounds
  32. 32Four Flock devices were vandalized in two weeks, and police pursued the cases
  33. 33Flock warned customers about public release of search logs and cut what the logs show
  34. 34School district staff know about community concern and are pushing for tighter controls
  35. 35Neighboring agencies are distancing themselves
  36. 36A Flock alert led to an arrest the day after an October 2026 stabbing
  37. 37MLPD reported other Flock successes to the Council in 2025
  38. 38What outside agencies said they were searching for
  39. 39The Chief described a 4–6 month “suspension” in early 2026; the logs show searches continuing
  40. 40The Town says the statewide and nationwide options were on when Flock delivered the system
  41. 41The Town’s own monthly tallies total 838,522 lookups on its data through September 2025
  42. 42The Town’s account of how outside access ended: found August 28, 2025, switched off, and back on for ten minutes
  43. 43The Town Manager calls Flock’s conduct a “significant breach of trust,” and says an audit it asked for never arrived
  44. 44The Town says its part of the system was shut down until May 19, 2026; its own charts show searches in every month of the shutdown
  45. 45Flock was switched back on in May 2026 by the Town Manager, five days after a blind-copied email to the Council
  46. 46The Town Manager, not the Council, approved the two Lake Mary Road cameras and the 24-month renewal
  47. 47The five Flex cameras: placed for an arson investigation, billed to July 2029, and cancelled September 16, 2026, the Town says
  48. 48The Town counts 25 logins; the department audit shows 24
  49. 49The Town describes what the Raven sensors record: four kinds of sound, in five-second clips
  50. 50The Town confirms officers can search by make, model and color; the 2024 staff report called the data “entirely anonymous”
  51. 51The school board approved the district’s Flock agreement in January 2025 with the Chief and a sergeant present
  52. 52The Town says Flock will now send quarterly deletion reports, and points to a 30-day transparency download
  53. 53Fifteen of the district’s twenty right-of-way devices are covered by Town permits; five are not
  54. 54The permits were issued by engineering staff; the first names the Town as owner, waives the fee and runs through 2026
  55. 55The plan sets are preliminary and unstamped, and the paperwork has small errors
  56. 56Two devices on Main Street need a Caltrans permit; none is in the records
  57. 57Where the permitted sensors are
  58. 58The Town can end the contract on 30 days’ notice if the Council does not fund it
  59. 59Flock deletes at 30 days; the Town’s own rules let MLPD keep copies “when no longer required”
  60. 60In June 2024 the Council was told every search would carry a case number
  61. 61The Town’s 2024 annual report lists where the first eight cameras went
  62. 62The June resolution priced cameras at $2,500; the staff report and slides said $3,000; the July resolution corrected it
  63. 63MLPD’s policy bars sharing plate data for federal immigration enforcement
  64. 64Mammoth’s representatives heard in April 2026 that Bishop had cancelled Flock after public input
  65. 65On September 16, 2026, a Councilmember asked for a public update from MLPD on Flock
  66. 66Council hears Flock update October 21; staff to bring back policy item November 4
  67. 67Council keeps Flock for now; directs staff to study alternatives and develop public transparency tools

Origins and approval

01

The Town Council approved a one-year, $25,000, eight-camera police program in July 2024

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the staff report's “entirely anonymous” statement alongside the order form's vehicle-description search. Oct. 8: added the June 5, 2024 hearing, from the meeting recording.

On July 17, 2024, the Council approved a one-year lease with Flock Safety, not to exceed $25,000 from the general fund, for eight fixed license-plate cameras at the Town's entry and exit points. Two of the cameras also received Flock's “Traffic Analytics,” which records vehicle state, make, and body type as well as traffic counts.

Staff told the Council that only authorized Mammoth Lakes Police Department (MLPD) personnel would have access, each with an individual login, training, and a documented reason for every search, and that use would be audited. Data would be deleted after 30 days and shared with other police agencies only for an active investigation. The presentation slides added that “MLPD owns the data,” that Flock “does not share with non-law enforcement,” and that the Council would receive an annual report. The staff report also told the Council that “the data captured by the ALPR unit itself is entirely anonymous,” while the order form in the same packet sells search by “Vehicle Fingerprint,” meaning make, model, color, and features such as bumper stickers, decals, and roof racks.

The vote followed a first hearing on June 5, 2024, which ended with the item tabled. Councilmember Chris Bubser asked “what assurances do we really have that when these data are deleted after 30 days they're gone forever.” Flock's representative answered that each image is “hard deleted” 30 days after capture and offered a follow-up with Flock's engineers. Sergeant Jason Heilman told the Council that the system lets an agency allow others to search its data, but “we are not going to do that, it's going to be shut off.” At the July 17 hearing, Town Attorney Andrew Morris said he had added contract sections 4.4 and 4.5, on deletion and reporting, in response to Council concerns, “largely” Bubser's.

Why it matters. This is the baseline: what the public and the Council were told the program would be. Every later finding is measured against it.

Sources (3)
02

The signed contract opted out of wide sharing but renewed automatically for two years

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the order form's network features, the renewal conflict with section 7.1, and the Truckee origin of the contract text. Oct. 8: added what the Council was told about the term, from the meeting recordings.

The Town's agreement with Flock, signed July 18, 2024, says the Town owns its data and “does not opt into the statewide or nationwide Flock network.” It requires Flock to verify deletion at least twice a year and report to the Town, and calls for a joint annual presentation to the Council. It also gives Flock a permanent right to use “anonymized” data for product development and machine-learning training.

The order form sets an initial term of 12 months and a renewal term of 24 months. It renews automatically unless either side gives notice at least 30 days before the term ends. So while the Council voted on a one-year lease, the contract itself carried the program into a two-year renewal by default.

The same signed document pulls in two directions on sharing. Section 4.1 says the Town “does not opt into the statewide or nationwide Flock network.” The attached order form lists “State Network (License Plate Lookup Only)” and “Nationwide Network (License Plate Lookup Only)” among the included features. The order form also makes renewal automatic, while section 7.1 says the Town “may exercise or not exercise” renewal “in its sole discretion.”

The contract was adapted from the Town of Truckee's. The Town's July 2024 agenda packet titled the proposal “Flock Safety x Mammoth Lakes PD (replicated Truckee),” and the Town Attorney serves both towns. The May 7, 2024 draft lists a Truckee email address for notices. Every version, including the signed one, sets venue “only in the Nevada County Superior Court” (Truckee's county; Mammoth Lakes is in Mono County), and section 7.2 refers to a “Section 17.14” that does not exist.

The term and renewal language was in the Council's July 17, 2024 agenda packet. At the June 5 hearing, Councilmember John Wentworth asked whether the Town could renew “one year at a time.” Flock's representative answered: “we can agree on any term… maybe after a year if you want to bring this back to the council and evaluate you know how effective the system has been… then you can renew for another year.” At the July 17 hearing, no one mentioned the contract term, the renewal, or the notice period before the 5–0 vote.

Why it matters. On paper, the contract described a closed, local system. In practice, continuing past year one required no new vote, only the absence of a cancellation notice. The Council had been told renewal could be decided a year at a time.

Sources (4)
03

Less than four weeks after the vote, the Police Chief asked Flock to pitch a school and hospital system

Updated Oct. 8, 2026: corrected. The Council heard in June 2024 that police were exploring a partner-funded gunshot system.

On August 12, 2024, Flock's territory sales manager emailed Chief Daniel Casabian, Mammoth Hospital's CEO Tom Parker, and Superintendent Annie Rinaldi of Mammoth Unified School District (MUSD). She wrote that “Chief Casabian asked that we put together a proposal for our Raven Audio Detection Solution that would cover Mammoth Hospital and the school campus,” along with 4 license-plate cameras “to create a virtual perimeter.”

Flock quoted Raven gunshot detection at $12,000 a year for a quarter square mile and cameras at $3,000 each per year, plus a $650 setup fee per camera. After an October 3, 2024 video meeting, the hospital's IT manager estimated the hospital's share at about $7,000 a year, “assuming that the school district also agree to pay a one third share.”

The Council had heard the idea before the vote. At the June 5, 2024 hearing, Heilman described Flock's Raven gunshot detection and said police were “currently in talks in sharing this technology with the school and the hospital.” Asked whether it was included, the Chief said it was an add-on: “that's something that I'm working with the hospital and the school district to split the cost on, but we would need to have that flock technology in place in order for them to purchase that.”

Why it matters. The second network did not start as a school-district idea. The Council heard in June 2024 that police were exploring a partner-funded gunshot system. The records show the Chief asking Flock for a proposal four weeks after the Council approved a police-only, eight-camera program.

Sources (3)
04

Flock told the partners they could run their own alerts and plate searches

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the hospital IT manager's October 2024 description of the system.

On October 10, 2024, Flock's sales manager wrote to the Chief, who forwarded it to the school district, County Office of Education, and hospital. Non-police partners “will have their own Flock account” with unlimited user licenses, can “create their own custom alerts,” and can “conduct a search on a license plate or vehicle description on their Falcon cameras.”

Her example: “a school principal could create an alert on a noncustodial parent's license plate and be notified when that vehicle enters school grounds.” Flock's earlier follow-up to the hospital listed alerts on “sex offenders,” “trespassers or banned people,” and “disgruntled employees.” The only things partners would lack, she said, were police alerts and access to cameras they had not paid for.

The hospital's IT manager came away with a broader picture. On October 4, 2024, he wrote that the cameras would “automatically alert PD if a previously identified vehicle belonging to a patient we either consistently have problems with, or have ‘fired’ from the hospital” entered the property, and that “it does the same with facial recognition, for the same reasons.” That was his understanding, not Flock's offer; Flock's public transparency page for the Town lists facial recognition under what the system does not detect.

Why it matters. The system was sold to schools and the hospital as a tool their own staff could use to track specific people's vehicles, not just as a gunshot alarm.

Sources (3)
05

The Chief organized the partners, but police stayed off the bill

Updated Oct. 8, 2026: added what the Council was told in 2025, from the meeting recordings.

On November 1, 2024, the hospital's IT manager told its foundation staff that “PD are specifically not getting financially involved for a myriad of reasons.” On December 10, 2024, Chief Casabian wrote: “Looks like we have four willing participants to partner in this program,” and said he would ask Flock “to keep the cost as low as possible.” He hosted the partners' planning meeting at the police department on December 20.

The four partners were MUSD, the Mono County Office of Education, Mammoth Hospital, and Cerro Coso Community College. The Chief later reviewed Raven sites on hospital property and delivered the Flock property license for signature (June 2025). The Town's February 2025 public post described it as “MLPD partnered with” the four to expand its camera coverage.

The Council was told about the plan but never voted on it. In a February 5, 2025 department report, the Chief said the four partners were “purchasing Raven” and that “it's going to be their contract with flock, they're sharing the flock information with the police department.” At the September 3, 2025 update, the Council heard that gunshot detection was active and that the school district shares its data with police under an MOU.

Why it matters. Police designed and promoted the expansion, then gained access to it, while the cost was carried by schools and a hospital district. The Town Council was told about it but never asked to approve it.

Sources (5)
06

The Town's own account grew from 8 to 15 cameras without a Council vote in the returned records

Flock's billing portal for “Mammoth Lakes CA PD,” printed September 17, 2026, lists five contracts. The original (September 2024) covers 8 cameras. A January 2025 “Expansion” adds 2 “Phase 2 Falcons” with analytics. A July 22, 2026 “Expansion” adds 5 “Falcon Flex” bundles with solar kits, on a term running to July 2029. Flock's device-health report the next day lists 10 standard cameras and 5 Flex cameras on a separate “Flex LPR” network.

The Council approved 8 cameras in July 2024. Its September 2025 item was “Presentation Only – No Action Required.” None of the returned staff reports or agenda links show Council action on the January 2025 or July 2026 expansions.

Why it matters. The Town's camera count nearly doubled after the Council's only vote. The Flex expansion came in summer 2026, as public concern was rising.

Sources (3)
07

Renewals are billed as two-year terms, and the Town said the Council approved “another year”

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the 2024 staff report's promise of a recommendation on whether to continue. Oct. 8: added the September 3, 2025 meeting recording.

Flock's September 15, 2025 invoice bills the original 8 cameras and analytics at $25,000, marked “Year 1 of 24 Month Term, 2025–2026.” Its January 11, 2026 invoice bills the 2 Phase 2 cameras and analytics at $7,000, also “Year 1 of 24 Month Term, 2026–2027.” The billing portal shows renewal dates of September 2027 and January 2028.

MLPD's October 2025 newsletter told readers: “The Town Council approved another year of Flock Safety ALPR cameras, giving us 10 cameras.” The September 3, 2025 staff report, however, describes a presentation with no action required. The 2024 staff report had promised that results “will be formally presented back to the Town Council at the conclusion of the year with a recommendation on whether to continue the program.” The 2025 update made no recommendation.

The meeting recording matches the staff report. The Chief introduced it as the Council's request to “return within one year” and report “how it's going.” No one mentioned renewal, cost, or contract term, and the Council took no action.

Why it matters. The public was told the Council approved the renewal. The Council's own records describe an informational presentation, while the invoices show two-year commitments.

Sources (5)
08

The first-year report to the Council covered MLPD's own searches only

Updated Oct. 8, 2026: added what the Council was told in the meeting, from the recordings.

MLPD's September 2025 “ALPR Annual Update” reported 10 cameras and 1,448 searches by MLPD from October 2024 to August 2025, including a spike of 333 during a “rash of vehicle thefts.” It highlighted six successes, including a hit-and-run, a stolen RV, and a reunited dog. It listed safeguards: “No sharing out of state,” “All searches require a reason,” and “Local sharing requires documentation.”

The slides did not mention outside agencies' searches. The network audit for the same months contains about 744,000 search records from outside organizations (see items 21–22). They also included a partnership slide with “3 additional ALPR cameras” and gunshot detection, but no costs or terms.

At the meeting, Heilman showed the Town's sharing settings and told the Council: “this network is not discoverable. Everything is disabled. We do not share out of state,” and “we do not have our network open up to where other agencies can search it.” Those statements match the settings in place by then (see item 24). At the June 2024 hearing, Mayor Bill Sauser had said he would be “very anxious at the end of that year to see… how many requests from other agencies.” The update did not give that number.

Why it matters. The Council's one scheduled check-in gave a picture of a small, local program. The returned audit data shows a much larger one.

Sources (3)
09

The public announcement was drafted with a contractor and overstated early camera numbers

Emails from January 31 to February 6, 2025 show MLPD's Christina Ackerman drafting the Town's Flock social-media post, with edits from an outside communications contractor using a personal email address. An early draft opened with “What the Flock?”, which was removed.

The published post said MLPD installed 10 cameras “in August of 2024.” The contracts show 8 cameras then, with 2 more added in January 2025. It described the partners' cameras and sensors as creating “a virtual perimeter around our community's schools and hospital,” the same phrase Flock used in its August 2024 sales pitch. It also said the cameras do not capture “personally identifiable information.”

Why it matters. Public messaging about the program was managed and promotional, and it borrowed the vendor's sales language.

Sources (2)

Ownership and control

10

There are two separate Flock accounts: the Town's and the School District's

The Town's account is “Mammoth Lakes CA PD.” MUSD has its own account, “CA – Mammoth Unified School District,” with its own deployment reports, account managers, and renewal notices. Flock's March 17, 2026 renewal notice to MUSD lists 3 license-plate cameras ($9,000) and Raven gunshot detection with “1/4mi” coverage ($12,000), for $21,000 a year, renewing automatically May 9, 2026 for 24 months.

MUSD's business officer calls it a “three-year deal” ending May 2028. In January 2025 he wrote that “MUSD mentioned being the main account holder for this service and are happy to take the lead.” In February 2026, Flock confirmed that the Raven sensors sit on a network separate from the district's cameras.

Why it matters. The expansion beyond the Town's cameras happened through the school district's account, outside any Town Council decision.

Sources (3)
11

The district's network is 25 gunshot sensors, 3 cameras, and 3 processing units

Flock's deployment tracker for the district account, dated September 17, 2026, lists 31 installed devices: 25 Raven gunshot sensors, 3 license-plate cameras, and 3 “compute boxes.” Twenty-three sensors were installed between July 23 and August 7, 2025, and two more in June 2026.

Twenty devices sit in the Town's public right-of-way. The rest are on property of the County Board of Education (3), the school district (4), the hospital district (2), and two private landowners listed as a family trust and a trustee. MLPD's July 2024 slides say one Raven device “can cover up to 1-square mile radius,” yet 25 were installed under a single quarter-square-mile subscription.

Why it matters. Most of the district's network is a grid of listening devices on Town streets and private land, not just three cameras near schools.

Sources (2)
12

Flock owns the hardware; each account holder controls its own data

Agencies subscribe to devices; they don't buy them. The property licenses signed by the County Office of Education and by Mammoth Hospital (June 13, 2025) both state that “Flock Hardware is the sole property of Flock Safety,” and the property owner can revoke permission with 30 days' notice. MLPD's report on a camera destroyed in August 2026 nonetheless describes it as “owned by the Mammoth Unified School District.”

Control of the data rests with each account holder. The Town's contract gives the Town ownership of its data. Flock told customers in December 2025 that “all Flock data is owned and controlled by the agency that collected it.” MUSD's business officer wrote in February 2026: “Since we are the contract manager, we control who gets what data.”

Why it matters. Local officials, not the vendor, decide who sees the data, what is shared, and how long it is kept. That puts accountability on the Town and the school district.

Sources (3)
13

The partners agreed to a $21,950 first-year cost split in early 2025

On January 6, 2025, MUSD's business officer sent the partners a breakdown based on their December meeting. First-year cost was $21,950: $9,000 for 3 cameras, $950 for setup, and $12,000 for Raven. MUSD, the County Office of Education, and the hospital would each pay $6,316.67. Cerro Coso would pay $3,000, toward Raven only.

On March 1, 2025, he asked for final agreement so he could “start with flock and finalize MOUs.” Cerro Coso's Kevin King replied “Yes, please proceed” on March 3, and the hospital agreed on March 11. The district's Flock subscription began in May 2025 (its renewal date is May 9), and installation followed that summer.

Why it matters. All four partners, including Cerro Coso, committed to the program in writing well before any formal agreement existed.

Sources (1)
14

The cost-sharing agreement was signed ten months after installation

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: noted the MOU's silence on search limits, retention, FERPA, and HIPAA, and the IT director's signature on Appendix A.

MUSD circulated a first draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) on June 17, 2025. Drafts from June and September 2025 named all four partners, split costs 28.78% each for MUSD, the County Office of Education, and the hospital and 13.67% for Cerro Coso, and required cyber-liability insurance. The hospital's COO signed a version in September 2025, after asking “I'm assuming no PHI?” (protected health information) and confirming the hospital's $2 million cyber coverage.

The final MOU, without Cerro Coso, was signed April 19–22, 2026 and runs from April 15, 2026 through May 2028. The cyber-insurance requirement was dropped. It makes MUSD the “primary manager and administrator” and fiscal agent. Authorized users are three County Office of Education staff and five hospital executives, with the hospital's IT director signing as authorizing agent on May 7, 2026; MUSD's own list is blank. The MOU sets no limits on hot lists, searches, or retention, and does not mention FERPA or HIPAA. The COO's question, “I'm assuming no PHI?”, has no answer in the returned records.

Why it matters. The system ran for most of a year before the partners agreed in writing who could use it and on what terms.

Sources (2)
15

MUSD paid the full first year, then billed partners over three years

MUSD “paid the full amount in FY24/25 and did not invoice due to unforeseen delays.” The MOU's Appendix B spreads that cost over the next two years. For 2025–26, MUSD invoiced the hospital and the County Office of Education $9,158.33 each: a $6,000 share plus half of the missed first-year share. For 2026–27, each is scheduled to pay $10,158.33.

The three-year total is $63,950: MUSD $25,316.68 (39.6%), the County Office of Education $19,316.66, and the hospital $19,316.66. The hospital's invoice is dated May 26, 2026, and the County Office of Education paid on June 25, 2026. The hospital's IT director told finance the cost “wasn't in the Security budget” and asked that it be added to the next year's budget.

Why it matters. These figures reconcile the partner invoices: $9,158.33 is a year's share plus catch-up for the first year.

Sources (3)
16

Police access to the district network came first, under its own short agreement

On August 19, 2025, Superintendent Rinaldi and Chief Casabian signed an MOU letting MLPD use MUSD's camera and gunshot data “solely for use in protecting public safety and responding to emergencies.” It bars sharing with immigration enforcement and “generalized surveillance unrelated to the purposes of this MOU.” It requires compliance with student-privacy law, says all access “shall be logged and subject to periodic review by MUSD,” and lets MUSD end access immediately.

It limits access to “designated MLPD personnel approved by both Parties.” MLPD sent its license-plate reader policy the same day, and sharing was being set up with Flock in early September 2025. In February 2026, MUSD's business officer proposed getting MLPD's list of “those who have our permission to pull the data.” That suggests a roster approved by both sides was not yet on file.

Why it matters. On paper, the school district holds strong oversight rights over police use of its network. The records show those rights being exercised only in 2026.

Sources (2)
17

Police use the district's networks; the paying partners do not

Flock confirmed in February 2026 that the district shared only with MLPD, and MUSD explained that police reach both the camera and gunshot networks with their police logins. On August 31, 2026, Flock again confirmed that MUSD shares “only with Mammoth Lakes Police Department” and that the hospital and County Office of Education are not listed as active accounts.

MUSD added that the hospital is “not currently interested in access.” The hospital's own security committee, meanwhile, had discussed in 2024 how to give MLPD “access to live camera feed” from its existing security cameras before setting the idea aside.

Why it matters. The organizations paying for the network don't use it. The police department, which is not billed for the district account in any returned record, does.

Sources (2)
18

Cerro Coso agreed to join, then withdrew; its replacement coverage went to the Town's Parcel

Cerro Coso's Kevin King approved the cost split in March 2025 and negotiated MOU terms with MUSD from June through September 2025. On April 7, 2026, MUSD told partners it was “official that Cerro Coso will be unable to participate,” and that “with the help from Chief we selected to have additional coverage in TOML's parcel development.” MUSD absorbed Cerro Coso's share for two years; the remaining partners split it in the third.

The district's tracker shows two gunshot sensors installed in June 2026, consistent with that relocation. On September 15, 2026, Kern Community College District stated it “is not in possession of public records responsive” to a request covering Flock agreements, although its employee's emails about the agreement appear in other agencies' returns.

Why it matters. Money raised for school and hospital safety now pays for sensors at a Town housing site chosen with the Police Chief.

Sources (3)
19

Records identify 18 license-plate cameras and 25 gunshot sensors

The Town's account has 15 license-plate cameras (10 standard, 5 Flex), and the school district's has 3, for 18 identified cameras. The district also has 25 Raven gunshot sensors. In all, the returned records identify 46 Flock devices in Mammoth Lakes, counting the district's 3 processing units.

Residents have counted about 25 Flock cameras around town. Raven sensors are also mounted on poles with solar panels, so some counted devices may be gunshot sensors. Other Flock customers, such as federal land managers, state agencies, businesses, or homeowner associations, could also operate cameras locally; no returned record from a local public agency bills for them.

Why it matters. The records now explain most of what residents see on local poles, and they show the network is much larger than the eight cameras the Council approved.

Sources (3)
20

Known public costs exceed $53,000 a year

The Town pays at least $32,000 a year: $25,000 for the original 8 cameras and analytics and $7,000 for the 2 Phase 2 cameras. The 5 Flex cameras added in July 2026 are on a separate contract whose price does not appear in the returned invoices.

The school district account costs $21,000 a year, shared with the hospital and County Office of Education under the MOU ($63,950 over three years). Known spending is therefore at least $53,000 a year, before Flex costs. Over current terms, the Town's known commitments through early 2028 total about $96,000, assuming the first Phase 2 year also cost $7,000. The district account's three-year total is $63,950.

Why it matters. Public money from four separate bodies pays for one connected system. No single board has voted on, or been shown, the full cost.

Sources (2)

How the system was used

California's license-plate reader law, and how it relates to these findings

Click to expand

California regulates license-plate reader data under SB 34 (2015), Civil Code sections 1798.90.5 to 1798.90.55. The main rules:

  • No sharing outside California public agencies. A public agency “shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law” (§1798.90.55(b)). “Public agency” means the state or a California city, county, or local agency (§1798.90.5(f)). In a 2023 bulletin to every California police agency, the state Attorney General wrote that this “does not permit California LEAs to share ALPR information with private entities or out-of-state or federal agencies,” and that it “applies to ALPR database(s) that LEAs access through private or public vendors” (Information Bulletin 2023-DLE-06, Oct. 27, 2023).
  • Public comment first. An agency must “provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the governing body” before implementing a program (§1798.90.55(a)).
  • A written usage and privacy policy, posted online, covering purposes, authorized users and training, monitoring, sharing rules, the custodian, accuracy, and retention (§§1798.90.51, 1798.90.53).
  • An access record for every query: date and time, the plate or other data used, the user and agency, and “the purpose for accessing the information” (§1798.90.52).
  • A private right of action. A person harmed by a violation may sue for actual damages of at least $2,500, punitive damages for willful violations, and attorney's fees (§1798.90.54).

How the records in this brief relate to those rules, stated as questions rather than conclusions, because the audit logs show the scope of a search and not whether it returned a Mammoth Lakes vehicle:

  • On July 29, 2024, 377 out-of-state agencies and two federal ATF offices ran searches whose scope included the Town's cameras (item 22). Two federal Veterans Affairs police searches followed in May 2025. Flock's representative had told the Council twelve days earlier that California data “is to be shared only internally within the state by state law.”
  • For 13½ months, about 315 California agencies could search the Town's cameras through statewide sharing (item 21). Sharing with California public agencies is what the statute allows; the question is who authorized it, since the contract says the Town did not opt in.
  • The Town's Flex network is discoverable by agencies within 50 miles (item 28); Nevada is within that radius.
  • Public comment was taken on the Town's program on June 5 and July 17, 2024 (item 1). The returned records do not show a public-comment item before the school district's network was installed in 2025.
  • MLPD's policy is posted as part of its Lexipol manual on the Town website and cites §§1798.90.51 and 1798.90.53 (item 29). Flock's “Offense Type” field replaces the free-text reason in future exports (item 33); a purpose is still recorded.

This note summarizes the statute and the Attorney General's reading of it. It is not legal advice. Whether a search that included Mammoth's cameras is a “share” or “transfer” under §1798.90.55 is a legal question these records do not settle.

21

Outside agencies ran about 835,000 searches that included the Town's cameras

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: separated the one-day out-of-state searches from the 13½ months of California statewide sharing; added the contract's no-sharing clause, four more top users, and a note on NCRIC.

MLPD produced 32 monthly “network audit” exports. Flock defines this log as “searches on cameras by that agency and by users at agencies they share with.” The exports contain 839,200 rows (837,099 after removing duplicates). Of these, 834,823 came from outside organizations and 2,276 came from MLPD. The outside records fall into two groups: 2,438 from 377 out-of-state agencies in one three-hour window on July 29, 2024 (item 22), and about 832,000 from about 315 California agencies between July 29, 2024 and September 11, 2025. The January–June 2024 files are empty, and the exported files contain 2,101 exact duplicate rows, most from February 12, 2025, which are removed from these counts.

Most searches came from large California agencies, led by the Orange County Sheriff (80,316), Riverside County Sheriff (67,160), CHP (52,184), San Francisco PD (40,929), San Diego County Sheriff (27,701), Los Angeles County Sheriff (21,606), LAPD (21,431), and the NCRIC fusion center (16,749). A typical outside search spanned 500 to 990 networks at once. The logs show the Town's cameras were within each search's scope; they do not show whether a search returned a Mammoth Lakes vehicle.

The signed contract says Flock “shall not share Customer Data with any law enforcement agency or government agency other than Customer,” and that the Town “does not opt into the statewide or nationwide Flock network.” Flock treats sharing as a setting the agency controls (item 24). So either the Town authorized statewide sharing in writing, or someone with Town administrator access turned it on, or Flock shared the data contrary to the contract. The returned records do not say which.

What is NCRIC?

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The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center is a “fusion center,” one of about 80 in a national network that the Department of Homeland Security describes as “the hub of much of the two-way intelligence and information flow between the federal government” and state and local agencies. It was established in 2007 by the board of the Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, a federal drug-enforcement program; the two operate in partnership and share an executive director. Its 2022 annual report describes giving “15000+ vetted law enforcement partners” access to the FBI's National Data Exchange (N-DEx), escalating suspicious-activity reports to the “FBI or other federal partners,” and working “dozens of investigations in coordination with the FBI.” It serves fifteen Northern California counties; Mono County is not one of them. NCRIC's own license-plate reader policy says it “will not share, disseminate, or sell any law enforcement data to law enforcement agencies outside California, federal law enforcement,” or anyone for immigration enforcement. Its 16,749 searches that included the Town's cameras ran from July 29, 2024 to August 28, 2025; 1,787 carried a case number.

Why it matters. This is the clearest gap between promise and practice. The Council was told the system would be MLPD-only, and the contract opted out of wide sharing.

Sources (3)
22

On its first day, the network was searched nationwide, including by federal agents

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the Oklahoma City searches citing a CBP case. Oct. 8: clarified that the out-of-state searches were a single three-hour window.

The earliest network audit records begin July 29, 2024, eleven days after the contract opting out of the nationwide network was signed. That afternoon, for about three hours (11:22 AM to 2:18 PM), the Town's cameras were open to nationwide searches. In that window, 377 out-of-state agencies ran 2,438 searches, including police in Texas, Georgia, Ohio, Virginia, and Florida, and 14 searches came from federal ATF offices in Nashville and Louisville; 4 by Oklahoma City police cite a Customs and Border Protection case. After 2:18 PM that day, every outside search in the logs came from a California agency. The only federal searches after that were 2 by a Veterans Affairs police unit in Loma Linda, California, in May 2025.

MLPD's September 2025 report to the Council listed “No sharing out of state” as a safeguard.

At the July 17, 2024 hearing, asked about vehicles “coming down from, say, Gardnerville,” Flock's representative told the Council that “in the state of California, the LPR data is to be shared only internally within the state by state law.” The out-of-state searches began 12 days later.

Why it matters. The opt-out the Council relied on was not in effect on the system's first day. Those searches came from federal and out-of-state agencies, the very sharing MLPD told the Council it does not do. See the note on state law.

Sources (3)
23

MLPD's own officers searched statewide from the start

MLPD's department logs record its own officers' searches by name. Most covered a single network, but the maximum scope reached 462 networks in September 2024, the first month of logs, and grew to 607 by August 2025. From September 2025 on, MLPD's widest search covered 3 or 4 networks.

Searches across hundreds of networks mean MLPD was participating in Flock's statewide lookup. The arrangement was reciprocal: Flock's own settings page explains that in statewide sharing, plate data from “your cameras and searches your agency performs will be accessible to all agencies enrolled in the same network.”

Why it matters. MLPD wasn't just exposed to the wide network; it used it. Statewide participation is a two-way exchange, the opposite of the local system described to the Council.

Sources (2)
24

Outside access stopped at the end of August 2025

Updated Oct. 8, 2026: corrected. The Council was shown the closed settings on September 3, 2025.

August 2025 shows 54,074 outside records from 261 organizations, running daily through August 28. Nothing follows until 26 outside records on September 11, 2025, the last outside search in the logs. Every record from October 2025 through August 2026 belongs to MLPD.

Flock treats sharing scope as a setting each agency controls. By September 17, 2026, the Town's settings show statewide network access “Disabled” and its main network hidden from other agencies. A drop this sharp points to a deliberate settings change. It happened as the school district's network was being connected to MLPD, and three months before Flock's December 2025 warning.

On September 3, 2025, six days after the last daily outside activity, MLPD showed the Council the closed settings and described them as standing practice (see item 8). The 26 outside records on September 11 came eight days after that presentation.

Why it matters. The system's reach was narrowed without public discussion. The Council was shown the closed settings, but was not told they had recently changed or that the network had been open for the prior year. See the note on state law.

Sources (3)
25

Since then, police routinely search three networks

The July 2026 network audit has 132 records and August has 138, all from MLPD, each covering three or at most four networks. MLPD's department logs for those months show the same pattern.

The logs don't name the networks. Three matches the networks MLPD is known to reach: the Town's camera network, the district's camera network, and the district's Raven network. The Town's separate Flex network, added in July 2026, may account for the occasional fourth.

Why it matters. Routine police searches now include devices paid for by the school district and its partners.

Sources (2)
26

Police logged 2,332 named searches; about a third listed a case number

MLPD's department logs list each search with the officer's name, stated reason, case number if entered, and search type. They begin in September 2024 and record 2,332 searches by 20 people. 838 (36%) include a case number, rising to 60% in July 2026 and 69% in August 2026. Thirty-six searches give “test” as the reason.

About 65% of all entries (1,515) are “search” queries rather than direct plate “lookups”; searches can use partial plates, state, or vehicle description. Stated reasons include stolen vehicles, arson, domestic violence, hit-and-run, welfare checks, and warrants. MLPD's September 2025 slide reported 1,448 searches for October 2024 – August 2025, close to the 1,396 in these logs.

Why it matters. Every search has a reason, but most lack a case number, and most are description-based searches that can identify vehicles whose plates nobody knows.

Sources (2)
27

Twenty-four people have held logins on the Town's account, including two Sheriff's employees

Flock's user list for the Town account (September 17, 2026) shows 24 accounts: 15 active and 9 deactivated. Six active users have administrator rights, which let them manage users: the Chief, two sergeants, a corporal, an officer, and an administrative user. Thirteen active users can search.

Two active accounts use Mono County Sheriff's Office email addresses (a K9 deputy and a sergeant), with a “Dispatch” role. They have the hotlist alert tool but not search, and last logged in September 2024 and February 2025. The Sheriff's Office answered a records request by saying “we have no records regarding your request.”

Why it matters. Access extends beyond MLPD officers to county employees, and accounts stay active long after their last use.

Sources (2)
28

Current settings: the main network is closed, but the new Flex network is discoverable

As of September 17, 2026, the Town's main network has statewide access disabled and is not discoverable by other agencies. Federal share requests are disabled. Filters exclude searches for immigration enforcement and reproductive care. Flock's optional “Audit Assistance” feature is disabled. Hotlists come from California stolen-vehicle and AMBER Alert sources.

The Town's separate Flex camera network, however, is set to be “discoverable” to law-enforcement agencies within 50 miles. That lets them request access. Permissions available on request include search, alerts, live video, recorded video, and video download. None are set to approve automatically.

Why it matters. The Town has tightened its main network. Its newest cameras are open to requests from nearby agencies, including for video. See the note on state law.

Sources (1)
29

MLPD's written policy describes request-by-request sharing that the logs don't reflect

Corrected Oct. 10, 2026: the audit section’s “462.5(e)” citation is a typo for the case-number-or-reason rule, not a missing section. Oct. 9: rewrote the description of the policy after comparing the 2024 draft with the 2026 published version.

MLPD's license-plate reader policy, published March 18, 2026 as section 435 of its Lexipol manual, is the 2024 draft the Council saw, renumbered from 426; the text is otherwise unchanged. The 2024 staff report said the draft “was modeled after the City of Vallejo Police Department's ALPR policy, which was crafted with input from the ACLU.” The policy says data “may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes,” with no limit to California agencies; the “No sharing out of state” safeguard shown to the Council is not in it. Other sharing requires a written request naming the agency, the person, and the purpose, approval by the Chief or a designee, and a police report documenting the release. It requires an annual audit of at least 10 randomly selected searches, written up in a memo to the Chief, to check that each one meets the case-number-or-reason requirement. (The policy cites that requirement as “section 462.5(e),” a typo for 426.5(e) in the draft; the 2026 version renumbered the sections to 435 but kept the old citation, so it now points to 435.6(e).) It states that “reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR,” which is standard Lexipol language, and it cites Civil Code sections 1798.90.51 and 1798.90.53 (see the note on state law above).

Between August 2024 and September 2025, the network audit shows hundreds of thousands of outside searches running through automated statewide sharing. That is a different mechanism from individual written requests. The policy also says every search must carry a case number, an incident number, “and/or a reason”; reasons are present, case numbers mostly are not.

Why it matters. The safeguards in policy assume sharing happens one approved request at a time. The system as configured shared continuously.

Sources (3)

Data, deletion, and public pressure

30

Data leaves the live system after 30 days, but not every copy is deleted

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the Chief's May 19, 2026 statement that no deletion confirmations had been received, Flock's answer, the retention-schedule clause, and the litigation case name. Oct. 8: added the Council's deletion questions.

Both the Town's networks and the district account are set to 30-day retention. In August 2026, Flock told MUSD that 7 days is an option. On September 3, MUSD requested 7 days and asked how it could verify that data isn't kept longer.

Flock correspondence that Chief Casabian forwarded to Bishop PD on June 16, 2026 shows what verification existed. On May 19, 2026, the Chief wrote to Flock that language “requiring reviews or confirmations related to the deletion process was incorporated into our contract terms. However, since implementation we have not received any formal correspondence or documentation from Flock confirming the continued operation of the automated deletion process.” Flock's account manager answered that deletion “is enforced through AWS's standard S3 lifecycle policy, not a Flock-built process,” and offered a quarterly confirmation email once the cameras were reactivated (see item 39). The contract's twice-yearly reports had been due since early 2025. The policy also lets MLPD keep data past Flock's 30 days under a Town retention schedule it does not quote, and lets officers save data to case files. A July 21, 2026 Flock notice to customers says that, as a defendant in In re Flock Group Inc. Automated License Plate Reader Litigation, No. 3:26-cv-02375-VC (N.D. Cal.), Flock has “an absolute legal obligation to preserve historical and future data” potentially relevant to the case, held in storage not accessible to customers. The notice does not say whether Mammoth Lakes data is included.

The Council has asked about deletion more than once. At the June 2024 hearing, Bubser asked what assurance there was that deleted data is “gone forever,” and contract sections 4.4 and 4.5 followed. At the September 3, 2025 update, as mayor, she asked: “How do we get those assurances that it's actually being executed the way they promised?” The Chief said he would “reach out to Flock” and suggested “another quick presentation with Flock.” No such presentation appears on a Council agenda in the 2023–2026 record. On December 3, 2025, Bubser said she would keep asking “what FLOC has done to respond to us about those very specific questions we had about our data.” The contract's joint annual presentation to the Council also does not appear.

Why it matters. “Deleted after 30 days” means deleted from what officers can search. Data saved to cases, held for litigation, or kept by the vendor can last longer.

Sources (5)
31

The gunshot sensors keep audio clips of ordinary sounds

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the school district's “ears only” description. Oct. 8: added public statements about audio and the Town's camera policy.

After a Raven sensor on Main Street was torn down on August 18, 2026, Flock gave MLPD “the last benign recording from the device,” made at 9:16 PM, which “sounds like environmental noise.” The officer uploaded the sound file to the case as evidence. In a second case, Flock reported the time a damaged sensor switched to battery power.

Flock and MLPD described Raven as gunshot detection that “quickly alert[s] dispatch of shots fired.” The case reports show the devices also save audio of non-gunshot sounds, and that Flock can retrieve that audio for police on request.

In August 2026, The Sheet reported that, per Chief Casabian, Raven sensors “cannot record or track conversations,” and that a recording “is retained for 30 days before being automatically deleted.” The case reports above show a sensor saving a non-gunshot recording, which Flock retrieved and MLPD stored as evidence. On March 18, 2026, the Council adopted a Security Camera Policy that bars audio recording on Town cameras. When Mayor Pro Tem Brent Truax, who had asked for that line, asked how it would apply where police need audio, staff answered that the policy “only applies to non-police installations… The police department has their own policies for their cameras.”

The district describes the sensors the same way the Chief does. On February 17, 2026, MUSD's business officer wrote that the district could cut police off from camera data “but leave the gunshot detection active since it is ears only.”

Why it matters. Twenty-five of these devices sit on streets, school grounds, the hospital campus, and private land. Their recordings are not limited to gunshots.

Sources (5)
32

Four Flock devices were vandalized in two weeks, and police pursued the cases

Updated Oct. 9, 2026: added the order form's device-monitoring language.

MLPD opened four cases between August 19 and September 2, 2026. Raven sensors were destroyed or damaged on Main Street near the post office, at the pickleball complex, and at Tavern Road and Inyo Street. A district license-plate camera at Meridian Boulevard and College Parkway was removed from its pole, its cables cut. Officers collected business security video and transit-bus footage. Flock quoted $800 per device, $500 per pole, and $350 per solar panel.

Flock data showed the Meridian camera stopped working on August 8, more than three weeks before anyone reported it. Its report names the plate and vehicle of the last car the camera photographed, a passing motorist with no stated link to the case. The Town's order form says: “We proactively monitor the health of your device network.”

Why it matters. Public opposition has turned physical, and investigating it pulls ordinary drivers' data into police reports.

Sources (2)
33

Flock warned customers about public release of search logs and cut what the logs show

On December 9, 2025, Flock's senior vice president of customer experience told customers, including MUSD, that a third-party website was collecting search logs released under public-records laws. He said Flock “has not been breached or compromised” and suggested “a temporary shift from Nationwide Lookup to Statewide Lookup.”

Flock also announced that, starting around January 31, 2026, network audits would no longer show “officer name, specific plates searched, vehicle fingerprint, and open text search reason,” and added a required “Offense Type” field.

Why it matters. The vendor treats public scrutiny of search logs as a problem to manage. Future releases will contain less detail than the records this brief relies on.

Sources (1)
34

School district staff know about community concern and are pushing for tighter controls

In February 2026, MUSD asked Flock whether it could stop sharing camera data with police while keeping gunshot alerts. Its business officer proposed getting MLPD's list of authorized users and making sure officers put their names on downloads. On August 10, 2026, the district's technology chief forwarded national reporting to leadership, noting “a backlash towards the town's flock cameras” on local Facebook.

On August 27, MUSD told Flock “our community, like many others, have questions.” On September 3, it requested 7-day retention and wrote: “We do reserve the right to remove access if they are misusing this data.” Those rights already exist in its August 2025 agreement with MLPD.

Why it matters. District staff are moving toward shorter retention, named users, and revocable police access. These are staff actions; the board has not taken a formal position in the returned records.

Sources (2)
35

Neighboring agencies are distancing themselves

Bishop PD's attorneys wrote on August 31, 2026 that “Bishop Police Department cancelled the contract it had with Flock” and “no longer has access to any of the data you request.” Bishop's production shows that Mammoth's police chief had shared Mammoth's Flock deletion details with Bishop's chief in June 2026. Bishop PD also appears in Mammoth's network audit, with 29 searches between September 2024 and August 2025.

Kern Community College District says it has “no Flock access, relationship, or equipment” and no responsive records. The Mono County Sheriff's Office says it has no records and referred the request to MLPD.

Why it matters. The agencies around Mammoth are stepping back from Flock, leaving MLPD and the school district as the program's core local operators.

Sources (2)

Flock successes

Documented cases where Flock contributed to solving a crime or finding a person.

36

A Flock alert led to an arrest the day after an October 2026 stabbing

Added Oct. 8, 2026

According to MLPD, officers responded to Mammoth Hospital at about 1:05 AM on October 5, 2026, for a stabbing that had happened about an hour earlier. The victim was flown out for further care and is in stable condition. Officers entered the suspect's license plate into Flock. On October 6, Flock alerted officers that the vehicle was heading eastbound on Highway 203. The Mono County Sheriff's Office located it southbound on Highway 395 and stopped it near Tom's Place. The suspect was arrested without incident on four felony charges and is held on $1,000,000 bail.

The case used a hotlist alert from a local camera and a handoff to a neighboring agency. It did not depend on statewide or nationwide sharing or on the gunshot sensors. MLPD notes that criminal charges are allegations and that the suspect is presumed innocent. No case report has been released yet, and the Town's weekly police log is posted only through August 23, 2026.

Why it matters. This is the core use presented to the Council in 2024: a plate entered after a violent crime, an alert, and an arrest the next day.

Sources (2)
37

MLPD reported other Flock successes to the Council in 2025

Added Oct. 8, 2026

At the September 3, 2025 update, MLPD described cases where Flock helped: a November 2024 hit-and-run solved from a partial plate, a shoplifting suspect found with stolen property, a stolen parking boot recovered for the ski area, an April 2025 domestic-violence suspect located and arrested after fleeing, a June 2025 dog returned to its owner after a crash, and a stolen RV from Nevada recovered with an arrest. In February 2025, the Chief reported that a missing elderly man under a Silver Alert from Riverside County was found after a Mammoth camera alerted.

MLPD told the Council it runs about 150 searches a month and uses the system “daily.” These accounts come from MLPD's own presentations. The case reports behind them are not in the records returned so far.

Why it matters. These are the local uses MLPD points to, and they can be weighed against the sharing and expansion documented elsewhere in this brief.

Sources (2)

Added to the brief after publication

Findings 38 and 39 were added to the published brief after its first release and placed by topic (38 under “How the system was used”; 39 under “Data, deletion, and public pressure”). They are gathered here so the findings read in order; the text is unchanged.

38

What outside agencies said they were searching for

Added Oct. 9, 2026.

Every search carries a reason typed by the searching officer. Among the 834,823 outside-agency searches, 74.7% of reasons are a single word and 5.4% include a case number. The most common reasons are “investigation” (42,510) and “inv” (36,332); about 840 say “test.” “LA HIDTA,” a federal drug task force (see below), appears about 12,000 times.

187 searches by 18 California agencies, between July 30, 2024 and July 1, 2025, name a federal immigration or customs agency in the reason: HSI (Homeland Security Investigations), ICE, or CBP. San Diego County Sheriff accounts for 97, including 56 marked “CP HSI” on March 4, 2025; Hermosa Beach PD 27 (“HSI Boston collateral,” “HSI red hook”); Baldwin Park PD 20 (“HSI KING”); West Covina PD 11; LAPD 10 (“smuggling and dope hsi”); CHP 1 (“ICE case”). HSI investigates drugs, fraud, and trafficking as well as immigration, so the reason text shows federal task-force use of a search that included Mammoth's cameras, not its subject. Two agencies labelled searches as protest-related: Escondido PD, “2/2/25 Protest ATI Vehicle” (7 searches, February 2, 2025), and Daly City PD, “SF PROTEST” (5 searches, June 14, 2025).

MLPD's own entries are more complete: 36% carry a case number, rising to 69% by August 2026 (item 26). MLPD's policy bars sharing “for purpose of federal immigration enforcement” and cites the California Values Act. The searches above were run by California agencies through statewide sharing, not by federal agencies directly.

What is LA HIDTA?

Click to expand

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program was created by Congress in 1988 and is administered by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy; the DEA dedicates more than 1,500 agent positions to it nationally. The Los Angeles HIDTA, designated in 1990, covers Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino counties. Its 2026 report to Congress describes “more than 71 Federal, State, and local” agencies and over 585 personnel in “co-located and commingled” task forces. Those federally funded task forces include units led by the DEA, the FBI's Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force, and two Homeland Security Investigations border-enforcement teams; its intelligence arm, the JRIC, is led by the FBI and is also the region's DHS-recognized fusion center. In the Town's logs, “LA HIDTA” was typed almost entirely by Orange County Sheriff's deputies (12,618 of the 13,167 reasons mentioning HIDTA). LAPD entered 96 searches as “LAPD GND HIDTA 52 DEA ST. LOUIS CASE LH-24-0023.” A HIDTA reason indicates a local officer assigned to a joint federal–local task force; the logs do not show whose case the search served.

Why it matters. While the Town's network was open, what it was searched for was decided by officers elsewhere, under whatever standards their agencies apply. The Town's policy governs only its own officers. See the note on state law.

Sources (2)
39

The Chief described a 4–6 month “suspension” in early 2026; the logs show searches continuing

Added Oct. 9, 2026.

On May 19, 2026, Chief Casabian told Flock that information Flock had provided “satisfied the concerns that were recently raised by Council Member Bubser regarding data retention and deletion practices,” and that “we are now in the process with Flock to get the system turned back on after about a 4-6 month suspension.” Flock's reply refers to quarterly deletion reports starting once the cameras were reactivated.

MLPD's department logs show its officers' searches dropping from 93 in December 2025 to 8 in January 2026, then continuing at 37 in February, 30 in March, 33 in April, and 70 in May. Each search covered three or four networks, which include the school district's cameras and gunshot sensors. So the Town's cameras may have been off while officers kept searching the district's devices, or something else was suspended. The records don't say. No Town Council agenda, packet, or minutes from December 2025 through October 2026 mentions a suspension or a restart, and the district's deployment tracker shows two new Raven sensors installed on June 19, 2026.

Why it matters. A months-long shutdown of a program the Council approved, and its restart, happened without a public record of either decision or of what was turned off.

Sources (3)

The Town’s October 2026 written response

On October 16, 2026, Town Manager Rob Patterson sent residents a written response to questions about Flock, with month-by-month charts of lookups on the Town’s data. The findings in this group compare that response with the records above. The response is posted in full; page numbers below refer to it.

40

The Town says the statewide and nationwide options were on when Flock delivered the system

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The Town Manager’s written response says: “we did not opt into the statewide or nationwide Flock network. However, these options were apparently turned on when the system was delivered by Flock.” It quotes section 4.1 of the agreement, the same no-sharing language cited in items 2 and 21.

The order form the Council saw in July 2024 lists “State Network (License Plate Lookup Only)” and “Nationwide Network (License Plate Lookup Only)” among the FlockOS features included with the system, describing a nationwide network “boasting 10 billion additional plate reads per month.”

Why it matters. This is the Town’s written acknowledgment that the wider network was open from delivery, which the audit logs in items 21 to 24 show from the first day. It leaves open why the setting was not noticed for thirteen months.

Sources (2)
  • Town Manager Rob Patterson, written response to residents’ Flock questions, Oct. 16, 2026, p. 1.Town response, p. 1
  • Flock Safety “Law Enforcement Contract” filed with the July 17, 2024 Council agenda, p. 9 (FlockOS features).Contract, p. 9
41

The Town’s own monthly tallies total 838,522 lookups on its data through September 2025

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response’s month-by-month list counts activity on Town data. The monthly totals add up to 838,522 from July 2024 through September 2025, nearly all of it labeled “Lookup” by California law enforcement. The network audit exports summarized in item 21 contain 839,200 rows for the same period and after. Several months match exactly: August 2025 (54,074), and July and August 2026 (132 and 138, all MLPD).

For July 2024 the Town’s list reads “5737 (Federal ATF Nashville TN, Nationwide LE) All Lookup,” and for August 2024, “36,414 (NCRIC – CA State Agency, California LE only).” The response notes that both months were “before the system was installed and no cameras were in place.” The exported audit for that month shows 2,438 searches from 377 out-of-state agencies in one three-hour window (item 22). The Town’s larger figure may include California agencies, which the chart does not break out.

Why it matters. The Town’s own figures confirm the scale of outside searching shown in the exported logs. The two sources differ only in how a few months are counted.

Sources (2)
42

The Town’s account of how outside access ended: found August 28, 2025, switched off, and back on for ten minutes

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says “Admin event tracking was only initiated in February 2025,” so changes to sharing settings before then were not recorded. It says Sgt. Heilman found statewide access on “around August 28, 2025” during an arson investigation and turned it off. The logs in item 24 show outside searches running daily through August 28, 2025, then stopping.

The response says the setting was “briefly switched back on around 9/11/2025 for 10-minutes for Sgt. Heilman to search for a Missing Person,” and that “In the 10-minutes … there were 119 searches by other agencies.” The exported network audit for that day contains 26 outside-agency rows, the last in the logs. The Town’s monthly list gives September 2025 as “Lookup: 119, Search (All MLPD): 65.”

Why it matters. The Town’s dates match the logs. The counts for the ten-minute window do not, and the settings history that would settle it has not been released.

Sources (2)
43

The Town Manager calls Flock’s conduct a “significant breach of trust,” and says an audit it asked for never arrived

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response describes Flock’s handling of the sharing problem as a “significant breach of trust” with an “inadequate response and notification.” It says that after a Flock webinar on December 11, 2025, the Town asked Flock for an audit of its system’s exposure: “That was never received.”

The Town’s December 2025 update had said there was “no indication that our system was reviewed by any other agency.” The monthly list in the October 2026 response shows lookups by other agencies on Town data in every month from July 2024 through September 2025, and the response itself says outside lookups began “when our system was set up, and before installation of any cameras.”

The response also relays two explanations from Flock. A Flock statement dated March 2, 2026 says some California agencies “had their camera networks inadvertently accessible to out-of-state law enforcement agencies.” Flock also told the Town that outside “search” entries in the logs “were lookup tags but had a been mislabeled,” and that the labeling was corrected in August 2025. The Town’s own list still carries those rows as “Search (Multiple Agencies),” rising from 106 in January 2025 to 15,845 in June 2025. Items 21 and 38 count “search” and “lookup” rows as the logs label them; Flock’s definitions are in the Key terms box above.

Why it matters. The Town’s December 2025 statement and its October 2026 list cannot both be right, and the list is the Town’s own numbers. Flock’s explanations are relayed by the Town; nothing in the released records lets a reader check them.

Sources (1)
44

The Town says its part of the system was shut down until May 19, 2026; its own charts show searches in every month of the shutdown

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says: “The Town portion of the system was shut down until 5/19/2026.” Its December 2025 note to the Council said: “The Raven gunshot detection system remains active in town.” Item 39 records the Chief describing the same pause as “about a 4-6 month suspension.”

The Town’s monthly list shows “All MLPD searches” of 83 in December 2025, 3 in January 2026, 26 in February, 20 in March, 25 in April and 64 in May. MLPD’s department audit logs (item 26) show 93, 8, 37, 30, 33 and 70 for the same months. The two sets differ slightly; both show use during the shutdown.

Why it matters. “Shut down” and the Town’s own counts describe different things. The response does not say which features were off, or whether officers were searching the school district’s devices during the pause.

Sources (2)
45

Flock was switched back on in May 2026 by the Town Manager, five days after a blind-copied email to the Council

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says the Chief of Police wrote on May 13, 2026 asking to reinstate the system, and that the Town Manager “forwarded the email via BCC to the Town Council on May 13, alerting them to the fact that I am inclined to re-engage with this tool.” One Council member asked how automated deletion worked and was sent a paper from Amazon Web Services. Then: “I waited 5 days for any comments or concern expressed from the Town Council and on Tuesday 5/19/2026, I authorized Chief Casabian to reinstate Flock for all contracted elements.” The Council was told in the Town Manager’s May 22, 2026 weekly update. In December 2025 the Town had said it would “engage the Town Council before anything is reactivated.”

No Council agenda, packet or minutes in 2026 lists the suspension or the restart (item 39).

Why it matters. The decision to restart was made by staff, and the Council’s involvement was an email with a five-day window. Whether that is what “engage the Town Council” meant is a question for the Council.

Sources (1)
46

The Town Manager, not the Council, approved the two Lake Mary Road cameras and the 24-month renewal

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says the two cameras added in January 2025 (item 6) sit on Lake Mary Road and cover the Lakes Basin for evacuation planning: “Cameras can approximate the number of people in that area at one time.” They were “approved by the Town Manager and not brought back to the Town Council,” under the Town Manager’s $75,000 contract authority, and added $7,000 a year. The response adds: “The 24-month contract extension was signed by the Town Manager,” and explains: “We had just come off a presentation to Town Council, full support indicated, including comments about expansion to fill gap areas. At the time, there were zero complaints about Flock.” It puts the total annual cost at $32,000: $25,000 for the first eight cameras and $7,000 for the two added.

Why it matters. This fills the gap in item 7. The Phase 2 cameras and the two-year renewal terms were approved administratively, under signing authority, not by a Council vote.

Sources (1)
47

The five Flex cameras: placed for an arson investigation, billed to July 2029, and cancelled September 16, 2026, the Town says

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says that after a June 25, 2026 arson near the Water District and meetings with the U.S. Forest Service, five trial cameras were proposed: Old Mammoth Road south of Minaret Road (northbound and southbound), Scenic Loop near Minaret Road (inbound and outbound), and Minaret Road near Chair 2 (southbound), with Main Street at Liberty Bar as an alternate. The Council was told in the Town Manager’s July 24, 2026 weekly update. The response says Flock offered “5 additional cameras, and our trial period would be 90 days from the date of implementation,” and that the plan was to “cancel before the 90-day period expired in order to avoid any additional charges.” It says “we cancelled the trial period with Flock on September 16, 2026, and the cameras are in the process of being removed,” and says the Town now “has 10 cameras.”

Flock’s billing portal (item 6) shows the same five cameras as a July 22, 2026 “Expansion” with a term running to July 2029. No cancellation document is in the records reviewed.

At the Council’s September 16, 2026 meeting, during budget public comment, the Town Manager (addressed as “Rob” in the recording) described “a short-term contract where additional cameras were placed for specific law enforcement activities, primarily investigation on arson,” and said: “That’s ending literally in two weeks, I think. We’re going to have all those cameras pulled.” He added that the system is used “to track who is departing an area where a crime has been committed,” not “to track anyone’s movements.” A resident who had counted 19 cameras asked how many would be removed; no answer is audible in the recording.

Why it matters. A 90-day trial and a three-year billing term are different commitments, and only the cancellation paperwork can show which one the Town was under. That document has not been released.

Sources (3)
48

The Town counts 25 logins; the department audit shows 24

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response gives “Total logins 25”: 12 current sworn officers, 11 former officers, 1 administrative assistant and 1 Mono County dispatch account. Flock’s user list for the Town account, dated September 17, 2026 (item 27), shows 24 accounts, 15 active and 9 deactivated, including two with Mono County Sheriff’s Office addresses.

Why it matters. The counts are one apart and describe the same thing: a small group of local users on an account that, for thirteen months, hundreds of outside agencies could search.

Sources (2)
  • Town Manager’s written response, Oct. 16, 2026, p. 8.Town response, p. 8
  • Flock user list for the Town account, Sept. 17, 2026 (item 27).User list
49

The Town describes what the Raven sensors record: four kinds of sound, in five-second clips

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response lists the Raven triggers as “1. Gunshots 2. Fireworks 3. Car crash sounds 4. Squealing tires.” On a trigger, it says, the microphones “triangulate the source of the sounds and begin recording in 5 second clips. Those clips are transmitted to the officers to hear the event directly,” within “15 – 20 seconds.” The same page says the cameras “do not capture faces or provide facial recognition attributes.”

MLPD’s 2024 slides described Raven as gunshot detection, with an alert “<60 seconds” after a shot, “90% accuracy rating – within 90 feet,” and “Firework detection – same accuracy.” Crashes and tire noise were not mentioned to the Council. Item 31 shows a sensor’s “benign recording” of environmental noise being retrieved by Flock and booked as evidence.

Why it matters. The sensors trigger on more than gunshots, and the clips go to officers. The 2024 presentation and the Chief’s 2026 statement that the devices “cannot record or track conversations” described a narrower device.

Sources (2)
  • Town Manager’s written response, Oct. 16, 2026, p. 8.Town response, p. 8
  • MLPD slides, “Flock Safety Gunshot Detection – Raven,” June 5, 2024 Council agenda, p. 12.MLPD slides, p. 12
50

The Town confirms officers can search by make, model and color; the 2024 staff report called the data “entirely anonymous”

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says the cameras capture “vehicle license plate, and vehicle make, model, and color. All of those attributes are searchable for MLPD in our systems and those that are shared with us.” The order form calls this Vehicle Fingerprint Search: “vehicle type, make, color, license plate state, missing / covered plates, and other unique features like bumper stickers, decals, and roof racks.”

The July 2024 staff report told the Council: “The data captured by the ALPR unit itself is entirely anonymous,” and that officers could identify an owner only by querying a separate DMV database. The same report’s analytics section listed state, make and body type as “Advanced Vehicle Recognition” outputs. Item 26 shows about 65% of MLPD’s own queries were description-based searches rather than plate lookups.

Why it matters. A plate number is one way to identify a vehicle; a make, model, color and roof rack at a given time and place is another. The Council was told about the first.

Sources (3)
  • Town Manager’s written response, Oct. 16, 2026, p. 8.Town response, p. 8
  • Staff report, “Resolution to Implement Flock Safety – 2nd Discussion,” July 17, 2024, pp. 3–5.Staff report, p. 4
  • Flock “Law Enforcement Contract,” July 17, 2024 agenda, p. 9 (Vehicle Fingerprint Search).Contract, p. 9
51

The school board approved the district’s Flock agreement in January 2025 with the Chief and a sergeant present

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says: “Chief Casabian and Sgt Heilman attended the school board meeting on 1/30/2025. During that meeting, the board approved the master service agreement between MUSD and Flock. This commitment was not between the Town and MUSD.” On the district’s devices in Town streets it adds: “Town Council did not review the MOU between MLPD and MUSD system. The MOU provided MLPD with user access to their system.”

Why it matters. The Town’s position is that the district’s network is the district’s responsibility. Items 16, 17 and 25 show MLPD is the agency that uses it, and the Town confirms the agreement giving MLPD that access never went to the Council.

Sources (1)
52

The Town says Flock will now send quarterly deletion reports, and points to a 30-day transparency download

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The response says: “we will request a report of records deleted for each quarter and provide that information to the Town Council.” It relays Flock’s statement that Town data “is automatically and permanently deleted after 30 days” by an Amazon Web Services lifecycle rule, with each deletion logged. It also says the Town’s website has a Flock transparency portal with “a csv download of all activity within the previous 30 days.” Item 30 records Flock offering a quarterly confirmation email in May 2026, after the Chief wrote that no deletion confirmation had ever been received.

Why it matters. Quarterly reports to the Council would be the first routine deletion evidence in two years of operation. The portal’s 30-day window means the public record of searches disappears unless someone saves it every month, which is how the logs in this brief were assembled.

Sources (1)

Permits and plan sets for the district’s devices

In response to a records request, the Town released three encroachment permits and the Flock plan sets for the school district’s gunshot sensors and cameras in the Town right-of-way. All six documents are posted in full; page numbers below refer to them.

53

Fifteen of the district’s twenty right-of-way devices are covered by Town permits; five are not

Added Oct. 18, 2026

Town engineering staff issued three encroachment permits for the school district’s Flock devices in Town streets. EP25-0014, dated April 3 and signed April 4, 2025, covers “1 solar powered ALPR camera, 8 solar powered gunshot detection devices, new poles where necessary.” EP25-033, signed July 8, 2025, covers three gunshot sensors on “1 existing streetlight pole, 1 existing traffic signal pole, and 1 new 14’ aluminum pole.” EP25-035, signed July 16, 2025, covers two license-plate cameras and two gunshot sensors on existing streetlights and two new 14-foot poles. The three plan sets list 16 device sheets, but one sensor (Flock’s R#018) appears in both the March and July plans because it was moved, so the permits cover 15 devices: 3 license-plate cameras and 12 Raven sensors.

The district’s deployment tracker (item 11) places 20 of its devices in the Town’s public right-of-way. That leaves five with no permit in the records the Town provided.

Why it matters. An encroachment permit is the Town’s only written approval for a device on a public street. For a quarter of the district’s street devices, the released records show none.

Sources (3)
54

The permits were issued by engineering staff; the first names the Town as owner, waives the fee and runs through 2026

Added Oct. 18, 2026

None of the three permits references a Council action, and no Council agenda from 2024 through 2026 includes the district’s devices. The first was signed for the Town by an assistant engineer and the other two by an engineering assistant in the Public Works Department.

The first, EP25-0014, names the owner as “Town of Mammoth Lakes – Public Right of Way,” is marked “Fee Waived,” does not mention the school district, and is valid “through the calendar year of 2026. This permit may be amended to extend this date.” It makes the permittee responsible for repair and maintenance, warns that some poles sit in “dedicated snow storage areas,” and says anything that conflicts with a future Town project “must be relocated or removed at the Permittee’s expense.” The second and third, EP25-033 and EP25-035, name Flock Safety as owner, charge a “$375 Encroachment” fee and are “valid for 90 Days”; EP25-033 adds “Installation on behalf of MUSD.” Flock’s own plan sets say each job is “on behalf of CA - Mammoth Unified School District.”

Why it matters. The Town’s position (see the Town’s response above) is that the district’s network is the district’s, not the Town’s. Its own first-phase permit names the Town as owner and charges nothing, and the later two name the vendor. What happens to the devices on Town streets after 2026 is a question the first permit leaves open.

Sources (3)
55

The plan sets are preliminary and unstamped, and the paperwork has small errors

Added Oct. 18, 2026

All three Flock plan sets carry a revision table whose only entry is “0 … FLK PRELIM,” and the engineer’s stamp box on every sheet reads “[THIS SPACE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK FOR STAMP]” beneath the words “I HEREBY CERTIFY THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY MYSELF OR UNDER MY DIRECT SUPERVISION AND THAT I AM A DULY REGISTERED ENGINEER.”

The documents also disagree with themselves in minor ways. On six of the sixteen device sheets the street address in the site table differs from the one in the location name (for example “R#014 379 Old Mammoth Rd” over a table reading “436 Old Mammoth Rd,” and “R#023 1414 Meridian Blvd” over “1467 Meridian Blvd”). The July 2025 plan set has two sheets numbered “A.01,” the second with “PREVIEW” where the case number belongs. Permit EP25-033 calls for a “30’ concrete foundation” where EP25-035 has “30-inch concrete foundations.” The contractor’s license number is 1086389 on the first permit and 1086983 on the other two, and the first permit spells the project supervisor’s name two ways.

Why it matters. These are the drawings the Town accepted for devices on its streets. None of the errors changes where a device is, but readers checking a location against the plans should expect mismatches.

Sources (2)
56

Two devices on Main Street need a Caltrans permit; none is in the records

Added Oct. 18, 2026

Main Street through Mammoth Lakes is State Route 203, which Caltrans controls. Permits EP25-033 and EP25-035 each carry the special condition: “A CalTrans permit is required for any work within the CalTrans ROW. This applies to any work on Main Street/ CA HWY 203.” The plan sets put one Raven sensor at 3141 Main Street (near Forest Trail) and one license-plate camera at “Main St @ Old Mammoth Rd WB,” 3250 Main Street. No Caltrans permit is in the records the Town released.

Why it matters. A device on a state highway needs the state’s permission, not the Town’s. If a Caltrans permit exists, neither the Town nor the district has produced it.

Sources (3)
57

Where the permitted sensors are

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The plan sets give each device a Flock number, a location name and coordinates. The 12 permitted Raven sensors are at 43 Wagon Wheel Road at Meridian Boulevard; 1414 Meridian Boulevard, by the Cerro Coso campus; 175 Sierra Park Road, by the hospital; 217 Sierra Manor Road, by the high school; 106, 238, 379 and 501 Old Mammoth Road; Tavern Road at Inyo Street; 309 Laurel Mountain Road; 3141 Main Street; and 52 Shady Rest Road. The three license-plate cameras are at Meridian Boulevard at Wagon Wheel Road (eastbound), Meridian Boulevard at Commerce Drive (southbound) and Main Street at Old Mammoth Road (westbound). Measured from the plan coordinates, the sensors sit about 100 to 760 meters from the nearest school, the hospital or the college; the cameras are up to about a kilometer away.

One sensor moved. The March 2025 plan put R#018 at 63 Center Street, on the north edge of the Parcel housing site; the July 2025 plan moves it to a new pole at Tavern Road and Inyo Street, inside the development. Both versions date from months before Cerro Coso withdrew from the partnership and its share was redirected to the Parcel (item 18).

Why it matters. The Council was told in 2024 that Raven would “protect schools, hospitals, major gathering areas.” The permits show a grid that also covers the main streets between them, and that a sensor at the Parcel was in the plan before the partners’ money was redirected there.

Sources (3)

More from the Council record

These findings come from the Town’s own agendas, attachments and meeting recordings, read alongside the records above. Each links to the page or the moment in the recording.

58

The Town can end the contract on 30 days’ notice if the Council does not fund it

Added Oct. 18, 2026

Section 11.16 of Flock’s master services agreement, attached to the June 5, 2024 agenda, says all of the Town’s payment obligations “are conditioned on the availability of funds appropriated for that purpose,” and that the Town “shall have the right to terminate this Agreement for non appropriation with thirty (30) days written notice without penalty or other cost.”

Why it matters. The two-year renewal terms in item 7 are not a lock. If the Council declines to budget for Flock, the agreement provides a 30-day exit at no cost.

Sources (1)
  • Flock Safety order form and master services agreement, June 5, 2024 Council agenda, §11.16, pp. 31–32.Agreement, §11.16
59

Flock deletes at 30 days; the Town’s own rules let MLPD keep copies “when no longer required”

Added Oct. 18, 2026

At the June 2024 hearing, Flock’s representative told the Council the data has “a time to live … in the Town of Mammoth Lakes’ case, that’s going to be set to 30 days,” and that “once that time period hits, that data is deleted off of our servers. We do not have access to it after that.”

The Town’s records retention schedule, adopted by the Council on July 3, 2024, lists “Recordings: Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR)” as item PD-025, retained “When No Longer Required.” MLPD’s ALPR policy says Flock will purge its copy at 30 days, but “this will not preclude MLPD from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established Town of Mammoth Lakes retention schedule.”

Why it matters. Thirty days describes the vendor’s copy. Anything MLPD downloads or books into evidence is governed by a schedule with no fixed end date, which is the gap item 30 describes.

Sources (3)
60

In June 2024 the Council was told every search would carry a case number

Added Oct. 18, 2026

Presenting the program on June 5, 2024, MLPD told the Council: “anytime you go to the system to do a search, you have to put in a reason why you’re doing the search and a case number assigned to it so we can track and audit this down the road.” A minute later: “You have to have a case number. You have to have a reason to go in and look, and that’s documented.” The same presentation said the system “is not used for traffic or immigration enforcement.”

Item 26 shows what the logs record: every search has a reason, and 36% have a case number.

Why it matters. The case-number requirement was presented as the audit trail. It was not built into the system, and the policy adopted later says “case number, incident number and/or a reason.”

Sources (2)
61

The Town’s 2024 annual report lists where the first eight cameras went

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The Town’s 2024 Year in Review, presented to the Council on April 2, 2025, says four cameras are “at the intersection of Old Mammoth and Minaret roads” and four on State Route 203: “inbound and outbound at Meridian Boulevard, plus inbound and outbound at The Village.” It describes the cameras as assisting investigations and helping “in evacuation planning by capturing real-time vehicle counts.”

Why it matters. This is the only Town publication that names the camera locations. Items 6 and 7 show the account later grew to 15 cameras without a public list.

Sources (1)
  • Town of Mammoth Lakes, “2024 Year in Review,” April 2, 2025 Council agenda, p. 21.Year in Review, p. 21
62

The June resolution priced cameras at $2,500; the staff report and slides said $3,000; the July resolution corrected it

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The resolution attached to the June 5, 2024 agenda recites “a flat annual rate of $2500 per a camera.” The staff report and slide deck for the same meeting price the program at “$3000 per year per camera x 8” plus “$500 per year per camera for Advanced Analytics Program x 2,” for $25,000. The resolution adopted on July 17, 2024 reads “$3000 per camera.” It also recites that the cameras “will not be used for Immigration enforcement.”

Why it matters. The item came back a second time in July for a public-comment requirement under state law; the price language was quietly corrected along the way. The $25,000 total, and the eight-camera count the Council approved, did not change.

Sources (4)
  • Draft Resolution 2024-xx, June 5, 2024 agenda, p. 1.June resolution
  • Staff report, “Resolution to Implement Flock Safety,” June 5, 2024, p. 5 (cost analysis).Staff report, p. 5
  • MLPD slides, “Flock Safety ALPR,” July 17, 2024 agenda, p. 5 (contract table).Slides, p. 5
  • Resolution 2024-xx as adopted, July 17, 2024 agenda packet, p. 104.July resolution
63

MLPD’s policy bars sharing plate data for federal immigration enforcement

Added Oct. 18, 2026

The ALPR policy the Council saw in July 2024, now published as section 435 of MLPD’s manual (item 29), says the Chief or designee “will consider the California Values Act” before releasing data, and that MLPD “does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the Town or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement,” naming ICE and Customs and Border Protection. The adopted resolution makes the same promise.

Item 22 shows that on the network’s first day, federal agents were among the out-of-state users whose searches included the Town’s cameras. Item 38 lists what outside agencies said they were searching for.

Why it matters. The policy restricts releases MLPD approves one at a time. It has no mechanism for the automated statewide and nationwide sharing that was on at delivery.

Sources (2)
64

Mammoth’s representatives heard in April 2026 that Bishop had cancelled Flock after public input

Added Oct. 18, 2026

Minutes of the Eastern Sierra Council of Governments’ April 22, 2026 meeting, chaired by Mammoth Lakes Councilmember Chris Bubser and attended by Councilmember John Wentworth, record Bishop Board Member Karen Schwartz reporting that “the City had received a lot of community input regarding the Flock cameras and ended up canceling their contract with Flock.” The minutes were approved on August 26, 2026.

Why it matters. Item 35 documents Bishop’s cancellation through its attorneys. This shows two Mammoth Lakes Councilmembers heard about it, and why it happened, months before Flock came back to the Council’s attention in September 2026.

Sources (1)
65

On September 16, 2026, a Councilmember asked for a public update from MLPD on Flock

Added Oct. 18, 2026

Near the end of the September 16, 2026 meeting, a Councilmember asked to hear from the Police Department “a quick synopsis of the Flock cameras, and how it helps them, and what information is visible to them … how long it’s saved, do we have records of who’s done searches,” and asked that it be put on an upcoming agenda. A second Councilmember said: “I’d love to hear an update from them as well.” The Mayor agreed to schedule it.

Why it matters. This is the first Council request for a public Flock item since the September 2025 presentation (item 7). The questions asked are the ones this brief tries to answer from the records.

Sources (1)

Update — Oct 21, 2026

On October 21, 2026, MLPD gave the Town Council its annual Flock update, the item Councilmembers asked for on September 16 (see the last finding above). This section summarizes that meeting from the staff report, the MLPD slides and the meeting transcript.

66

Council hears Flock update October 21; staff to bring back policy item November 4

Added Oct. 22, 2026

On October 21, 2026, the Town Council received a Police Department Flock Safety Update 2026 as a presentation only, with no action required. The staff report says it covers the second year of operation. A staff presenter said Council could not act that night and that staff would ask for a future policy discussion. The Town Manager recommended bringing a policy agenda item to the November 4 Council meeting to weigh the system’s merits against its vulnerabilities. He said he and the Chief had lost trust in the data integrity and security Flock provides.

The slides list 10 original license-plate cameras and 5 Flex cameras installed July to October 2026. They also list 25 Raven devices, and 3 license-plate cameras obtained by the school district, Mammoth Hospital and the Mono County Office of Education. The slides describe Raven as keeping a 3 to 5-second audio snippet after a threat is identified, with triangulation to within 90 feet. A chart of MLPD searches from September 2025 to August 2026 totals 842. Staff cited examples from May to October 2026, including stolen-vehicle recoveries, a Silver Alert contact and an arrest in a stabbing case. Staff said the Town’s lookups are off, and that the 5 trial cameras were removed after the contract was cancelled in mid-September.

Staff described oversight steps. Every search requires a case or incident number and a reason. Flock added an audit assistance tool that flags unusual search patterns for supervisors. A supervisor said he matches each month’s audit log against case records. Staff also said the public transparency portal offers a CSV download of the last 30 days. They said monthly files might be posted beyond 30 days if the system is kept. Staff said Mono County Dispatch has a login that receives alerts but cannot run searches.

Several residents spoke during the item and asked Council to cancel the Flock contract. Some also asked for a Town ordinance on AI surveillance technology. In feedback on the presentation, one councilmember said “shut it down.” Others asked for the item to come back, with staff saying it could return in two weeks. One councilmember noted the Town would keep paying the monthly fee until the contract ends.

Flock ALPR — explored in depth

Click to expand

This subject is explored in depth in the Flock investigation. The Oct. 21 update is item 66; the Nov. 4 Council decision is consolidated in item 67.

Why it matters. This is MLPD’s first public report on the system since the Council’s September 16 request, and it sets up a November 4 Council policy item on whether to keep Flock.

Sources (3)

Update — Nov 4, 2026

On November 4, 2026, the Town Council took up agenda item 9.2. The recited motion continued the Town’s Flock ALPR system while staff develops transparency and monitoring tools and studies alternative providers for later Council consideration. No complete comprehensive final motion was formally restated before the roll call; whether “report and bring back options” was the agreed final wording remains uncertain. Official minutes were not yet posted at publication time.

67

Council keeps Flock for now; directs staff to study alternatives and develop public transparency tools

Added Nov. 6, 2026

On November 4, 2026, Town Council agenda item 9.2 was “Discussion and decision on use of Flock – automated license plate reader (ALPR) within the Town of Mammoth Lakes.” The Town Manager’s action sheet offered three recommended directions: keep Flock while continuing to develop public transparency and monitoring tools; discontinue Flock and cancel the contract; or keep or stop Flock while seeking another ALPR provider and switching “as quickly as possible.”

Staff and Chief Kasabian opened with investigative examples and the audit/transparency steps described on October 21 (finding 66), then took public comment. Named speakers in the machine transcript urged ending the Flock contract (Brianna Gonzalez; Lena Martinson; Albert Benson; Misha Little Bear Bateman, online). One speaker questioned whether the cameras were needed and another supported them. A councilmember also said three emailed comments favoring termination arrived minutes before the meeting.

After deliberation, Cleland Hoff first moved a direction based on the staff sheet’s third option (continue Flock and, at the end of the current contract, switch providers), then said, “I withdrew my motion” at 1:35:49; the transcript then stated that no motion was on the floor. At 1:35:52, Mayor Rice clarified the sequence: Sauser made a motion, and then John Wentworth tried to modify it. At 1:35:56, the transcript recited Bill Sauser’s motion as directing the town manager to continue using the Flock ALPR system, to continue to develop transparency and monitoring tools, to direct staff to study alternative providers, and to bring a report to Council for a decision. At 1:36:11, Mayor Rice added, “That was your motion,” clarifying the motion; at 1:36:13, Cleland Hoff replied, “I’m good with that. And I will second that,” seconding Sauser’s motion.

At 1:36:15, a speaker preferred “options” rather than a “report”; staff proposed “instead of reports, you’re going to bring back options for the town council.” The response was, “How about report and bring back options in this?” followed by “Okay”; Hoff then continued. During this report/options exchange, which continued through approximately 1:37:18, Councilmember John Wentworth and Mayor Pro Tem Truax discussed beginning the alternative-provider search now without committing the Town to an immediate switch. No single comprehensive formal motion containing those terms was subsequently recited before the roll call; whether report-and-bring-back-options was the agreed final wording is still uncertain.

At 1:37:23, the roll call recorded yes votes from Bill Sauser, Council Member Wentworth, Council Member Cleland Hoff, Mayor Pro Tem Truax, and Mayor Rice. The motion carried 5–0.

Flock ALPR — explored in depth

Click to expand

This update follows item 66, the Oct. 21 Flock update.

Why it matters. Finding 66 ended with staff promising a November 4 policy item on whether to keep Flock. This vote kept the system in use, told staff to keep improving public transparency tools, and ordered a study of alternatives with discussion of a report and options for later Council consideration. It was not an immediate cancellation or an adoption of Hoff’s earlier withdrawn motion, and it did not resolve the exact final report-and-options wording.

Sources (3)

See the records yourself

Every document cited above is posted in full, grouped by the agency that released it.

Go to the documents
Compiled from records released under the California Public Records Act, 2026. Posted copies are lightly redacted to protect uninvolved people; see the documents page. Questions, corrections, or requests for the full set: transparentmammoth@protonmail.com. Browse all documents.